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Abstract.  Using truels, or three-person duels, as an example, we show that how 
players perceive a multiple-round game will end can make a big difference in whether it 
ends non-cooperatively (producing a “bang”) or just peters out (producing a “whimper”): 
 
1.  If the players view the number of rounds as bounded—reasonable, because the game  
     must end in a finite number of rounds—they will shoot from the start. 
 
2.  If the players view the number of rounds as unbounded—reasonable, because the  
    horizon of the game is infinite—then a cooperative equilibrium, involving no    
    shooting, can also occur. 
 
Real-life examples are given of players with bounded and unbounded outlooks in 
truel-like situations.  Unbounded outlooks encourage cooperative play, foster hope, and 
lead to more auspicious outcomes.  These outcomes are facilitated by institutions that put 
no bounds on play—including reprisals—thereby allowing for a day of reckoning for 
those who violate established norms.  Eschatological implications of the analysis, 
especially for thinking about the future and how it might end, are also discussed. 
 
JEL Classification:  N72 
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Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
1 
Our subject is the end of games that real human beings play.  Because these games 
can affect how humanity fares in this and possibly other worlds, they have eschatological 
significance.  
Games may be bounded or unbounded.  Bounded games are those which end after 
a certain time, or after a specific number of rounds have been played.  In unbounded 
games, there is no such limit or bound.   
Is life bounded?  Although there seems to be no confirmed case of a person’s 
having lived more than 125 years (the confirmed maximum is 122 years, achieved by a 
French woman who died in 1997), there is no logical reason or scientific barrier to 
preclude a person, should he or she reach the age of 125, from living to be 126.  Hence, 
to say that life is bounded by a limit, like 125 years, seems unjustified. 
But what about extending that limit to 250 years, 1,000 years, or even 1,000,000 
years?  It seems absurd that any of us will ever approach such an age.  On the other hand, 
the possibility that our genetic material might somehow be preserved or renewed is not so 
easy to dismiss.  Alternatively, living our lives through our descendants—if the definition 
of life is broadened to include them—renders “ages” like 250, 1,000, or 1,000,000 years 
conceivable. 
                                                 
1  Steven J. Brams acknowledges the support of the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York 
University, and D. Marc Kilgour the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada.  We thank Geir B. Asheim for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.  Although 
this paper is relatively nontechnical, there is some discussion, especially in the footnotes, of more technical 
concepts in game theory that underlie our somewhat informal analysis. 3 
The probability that any of us will, as individuals, live more than 125 years is at 
present infinitesimal.  Practically speaking, it is reasonable to suppose that our lives are 
bounded by about 125 years.   
Basing our actions on this limit, however, may induce very different rational 
choices from those that reflect the view that life is unbounded.  To illustrate this point, we 
will describe several games, some of which are bounded and some of which are not.  The 
available choices of the players in these games are all the same, but whether the games 
are perceived to be bounded critically affects how they are rationally played. 
The game we conclude with, an infinite-horizon game, is perhaps the most 
realistic:  the horizon is infinite—because any pre-specified bound can be exceeded—but 
the end occurs before the infinite horizon is reached, guaranteeing that any play of the 
game is finite.
2  Interestingly enough, if the players’ outlooks are unbounded in this 
game, they have an incentive to be cooperative, causing the game to peter out in a 
“whimper”; if their outlook is bounded, they will be non-cooperative, causing the game 
to end in a “bang” (we mean this quite literally, as the game will illustrate).  
There is no incontrovertible argument, nor evidence we know of, that either 
outlook is correct.  People can behave rationally under the presumption that an infinite-
horizon game will grind to a halt, which it definitely will because it is finite.  But because 
the same game can go on indefinitely, it is impossible to predict this termination exactly.   
                                                 
2 Carse’s (1986) distinction between finite and infinite games is very different:  the former are essentially 
short-term zero-sum games, whereas the latter are long-term nonzero-sum games that are invariably 
beneficial to their players, who can even on occasion change the rules to “improve” the game.  Carse’s 
analysis of infinite games, which is untouched by game theory, seems to us wistfully naïve; by comparison, 
we use game theory to try to show how games that may continue indefinitely offer some realistic hope for 
improving the lots of their players under certain conditions.  For more on the application of game theory to 
the Bible and religion and theology, see Brams (1980, 1983).  4 
Eschatology postulates an end, but it is often quite vague about when it will occur.  
This vagueness, we suggest, can be clarified using game theory:  
• If people are “forward thinking” (unbounded), they will look ahead to determine  
   how to behave, based on their expectations about the future; 
• If people are “backward thinking” (bounded), they will look back from the  
   presumed end, determining optimal choices to make on last round, the next-to-   
   last round, and so on, until they make their initial choices.  
Looking ahead, a person calculates expected values, based on events that can 
happen and probabilities associated with their occurrence (if known).  Looking backward, 
a person calculates that because a game will end at some point, he or she can determine 
rational choices before then by tracing out the consequences of actions and reactions 
along the path to this end in a process called backward induction.  As Theodore Sorensen 
put it in describing the deliberations of the Executive Committee (Excom) during the 
October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, “We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to 
any possible move by the United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to 
that Soviet reaction, and so on, trying to follow each of those roads to their ultimate 
conclusion” (quoted in Holsti, Brody, and North, 1964, p. 188).  
During the Cuban missile crisis, many people thought that the world might come 
to an end in a nuclear exchange between the superpowers, rendering their lives decidedly 
bounded.  But when the crisis subsided after thirteen days, life for most people regained 
its unbounded character. 5 
To be sure, the end of the universe may be little affected by such human events.  
Rather, the universe seems more an impersonal entity, even if it contains human beings 
capable of rational thought and action.  
Understanding better how human beings view and play games may, nonetheless, 
illuminate how the universe, which possibly embodies a kind of rationality even if no 
single entity directs its behavior, moves toward some endstate.  At a more personal level, 
the eschatological view we hold about the boundedness of games may well affect our 
rational choices in them.  As a preview of the distinction between bounded and 
unbounded games, we start with a simple hypothetical game, whose rules we will 
progressively change to produce, in the end, an infinite-horizon game. 
A Sequential Truel 
Imagine three players, A, B, and C, situated at the corners of an equilateral 
triangle.  They engage in a truel, or three-person duel, in which each player has a gun 
with one bullet.
3 
Assume that each player is a perfect shot and can fire at one other player at any 
time.
4  There is no fixed order of play, but any shooting that occurs is sequential:   no 
player fires at the same time as any other.  Consequently, if a bullet is fired, the results 
are always known to all before another bullet is fired.   
Finally, assume that each player ranks the outcomes from best to worst as follows: 
(1) survive alone, (2) survive with one other player, (3) survive with both other players, 
                                                 
3 Background on truels, including some with rules quite different from those analyzed here, can be found in 
Kilgour and Brams (1997). 
4 We rule out the possibility of firing in the air, which would be an optimal choice for a player if it were the 
first to fire.  For once a player has disarmed itself, it would be no threat to its two opponents, which would 
then have an incentive to shoot each other in a duel.  (Why?  Because if the second player to choose also 6 
(4) not survive, with no opponents alive, (5) not survive with one opponent alive, and (6) 
not survive with both opponents alive.  Thus, surviving alone is best, dying alone worst. 
Who, if anybody, will shoot whom?  It is not difficult to see that outcome 3, in 
which nobody shoots and, therefore, all three players survive, is the rational outcome.  
Suppose, on the contrary, that A shoots B, hoping for A’s outcome 2, whereby it and C 
survive.  A’s best outcome, surviving alone, is now impossible—C will not shoot itself.  
In fact, C, preferring its outcome 1 to outcome 2, will next shoot a disarmed A, leaving 
itself as the sole survivor.   
But this is A’s outcome 5, in which A and one opponent (B) are killed while the 
other opponent (C) lives.  To avoid this outcome, A should not fire the first shot; neither, 
for the same reason, will the other two players.  Consequently, nobody will shoot, 
resulting in outcome 3, in which all three players survive. 
Moreover, it will not pay for any two players—say, A and B—to collude and both 
shoot C, thereby expending their bullets and posing no threat to each other.  For if they 
agree to collude, it would be in each of A’s and B’s interests to renege and not shoot C— 
saving its bullet for its partner after that player shoots C—because each player always 
most prefers its outcome 1.
5  
Thus, thinking ahead about the unpleasant consequences of shooting first or 
colluding, nobody will shoot or collude.  Thereby, all players will survive if the players 
must act in sequence, giving outcome 3.   
This thinking is also rational in the infinite-horizon truel we will describe at the 
end of the next section.  However, there is another point of view, equally rational, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
fired in the air, the third player, acting according to the goals described in the next paragraph, would shoot 
one of the two disarmed players.)   7 
might be taken in this truel.  It yields an ominous outcome, suggesting how conflicts 
among people, groups, countries, or possibly even larger entities in the universe can lead 
to death and destruction. 
 
Simultaneous Truels 
1.  One round.  The rules no longer allow the players to choose in sequence, one 
after another, whereby late choosers learn the choices that other players made earlier.  
Instead, all three players must now make simultaneous choices of whether or not to shoot, 
and at which other player, in ignorance of what the other players do (i.e., they cannot 
communicate with each other to coordinate their choices).  This situation is common in 
life; we must often act before we find out what others are doing.  
Now everybody will find it rational to shoot an opponent at the start of play.  This 
is because no player can affect its own fate, but each does at least as well, and sometimes 
better, by shooting another player—whether the shooter lives or dies—because the 
number of surviving opponents is reduced. 
If each player chooses its target at random, it is easy to see that each has a 25% 
chance of surviving.  Consider player A; it will die if B, C, or both shoot it (3 cases), 
compared with its surviving if B and C shoot each other (1 case).  Altogether, one of A, 
B, or C will survive with 75% probability, and nobody will survive with 25% probability 
(when each player shoots a different opponent).  Outcome:  There will always be 
shooting, leaving either one or no survivors.
6 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Implicitly, we assume that there is no mechanism to enforce agreements, including agreements to collude. 
6 If there is one survivor, then the three players did not all shoot different opponents.  Clearly, the two non-
survivors in this situation would be better off if there were no survivors (outcome 4) rather than one 
surviving opponent (outcome 5).  In fact, the strategies associated with outcome 4—each player shoots 
somebody different—constitute a Nash equilibrium, because if any player deviates and shoots the same 8 
2.  n rounds (n = 2 and known).  Assume that nobody has shot an opponent in the 
first n – 2 rounds.  We next demonstrate that on the (n – 1)
st round, either at least two 
players will rationally shoot, or none will.  
First, consider the situation in which an opponent shoots A.  Clearly, A can never 
do better than shoot, because A is going to be killed anyway.  Moreover, A does better to 
shoot at whichever opponent (there must be at least one) that is not a target of B or C.
7   
Now suppose that nobody shoots A.  If B and C shoot each other, then A has no 
reason to shoot (though A cannot be harmed by doing so).  If one opponent, say B, holds 
its fire, and C shoots B, A again cannot do better than hold its fire also, because it can 
eliminate C on the next round.  (Note that C, because it has already fired its only bullet, 
does not threaten A.)   
Suppose both B and C hold their fire.  If A shoots an opponent, say B, then its 
other opponent, C, will eliminate A on the n
th round.  But if A holds its fire, the game 
passes onto the n
th round and, as discussed earlier, A can expect a 25% chance of 
survival.  Thus, if nobody shoots, A again cannot do better than hold its fire. 
Whether the players refrain from shooting on the (n – 1)
st round or not—each 
strategy may be a best response to what the other players do—shooting will be rational 
on the n
th round if there is more than one survivor and at least one player has a bullet 
remaining.  But the anticipation of shooting on the n
th round may cause strategies to 
                                                                                                                                                 
opponent as someone else, the deviator does worse (outcome 5 for it).  However, to put this Nash 
equilibrium into effect would require that the players communicate and coordinate their choices, which we 
have ruled out.  In fact,  there are three other Nash equilibria in which two players shoot each other and the 
third holds its fire, but we reject them on the grounds that the strategy of holding one’s fire is dominated—
there is another strategy (in this case, there are two:  shooting one or the other of one’s opponents) that is 
never worse and sometimes better.  
7 As we showed in note 6, when all players fire at different targets, these strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium.  This firing occurs immediately, for reasons that will be spelled out in note 8. 9 
“unravel” back to the 1
st and 2
nd rounds.
8  Outcome:  There will always be shooting, 
leaving one or no survivors. 
3.  n rounds (n unlimited).  The new wrinkle here is that it may be rational for no 
player to shoot on any round, leading to the survival of all three players.  How can this 
happen? 
Our argument earlier that “if you are shot at, you might as well shoot somebody” 
still applies.  But even if you are, say, A, and B shoots C, you cannot do better than shoot 
B, making yourself the sole survivor (outcome 1).  As before, you do best—whether you 
are shot at or not—if you shoot somebody who is not the target of anybody else, 
beginning on round 1. 
But now suppose that B and C refrain from shooting in round 1, and consider A’s 
situation.  Shooting an opponent is not rational for A on round 1, because the surviving 
opponent will then shoot A on the next round (there always is a next round if n is 
unlimited).  On the other hand, if all players hold their fire, and if they continue to do so 
in subsequent rounds, then all three players remain alive.  
While there is no “best” strategy in all situations,
9 the possibilities of survival 
increase if n is unlimited.  Outcome:  There may be zero, one (any of A, B, or C), or three 
survivors, but not two survivors.   
                                                 
8 Here is the argument for unraveling:  On the n
th round (n known), players will always shoot if they have 
any bullets remaining; knowing that this choice is optimal on the last round, players can do no worse than 
make this choice on the (n – 1)
st round, treating the (n – 2)
nd round as if it were the next -to-last round.  
Eventually, this reasoning will carry the players back to the 1
st round, treating it as if it were the next-to-last 
round and the 2
nd round as if it were the last round.  Shooting may therefore be rational on the 1
st and 2
nd 
rounds.   
9 This is because what is best for a player depends on what theother players do.  By contrast, not being the 
first to shoot in the sequential truel we analyzed at the beginning is a dominant strategy—it cannot be 
improved upon, whatever the other players do.  10 
4.  Infinite-horizon.  This truel is really a variant of situation 3 above that 
incorporates a more realistic feature.  Specifically, at the end of round i and all 
subsequent rounds, a random event occurs that determines whether the truel continues at 
least one more round (with probability pi at the end of round i) or ends immediately (with 
probability 1 – pi).  Thus, the probability that a truel ends after exactly k rounds is p1p2 . . 
. pk–1(1 – pk).  The truel is bounded if and only if pi = 0 for some round i. 
If the truel is not bounded (i.e., is infinite horizon), it models games that—like life 
itself—do not continue forever.  While we cannot say at what point such games end, we 
know they do not continue indefinitely.  In such circumstances, if pi is sufficiently high 
on each round i, it may be rational never to shoot (Brams and Kilgour, 1998, show that 
this is also true for a sequential truel with a fixed order of play).  
Yet the structure of such games means that the players can anticipate that the truel 
will end with virtual certainty after several rounds.  For example, if pi = .51 for all i, there 
is a probability of 1 – (.51)
20 = .9999986 that, after 20 rounds of play, the game will have 
terminated.  Effectively, then, this can be thought of as an n-round game (n known), à la 
situation 2, in which there is only slightly more than one chance in a million (i.e., 
probability .0000014) that the game will not end by round 20.   
Applying the reasoning of situation 2 by treating the virtual certainty of 
termination as a certainty, the players will shoot in rounds 1 or  2, leaving at most one 
survivor.
10  Outcome:  How many survivors there are depends on whether the truel is 
viewed as bounded (at most one player survives) or unbounded (all three players may 
                                                 
10 This non-cooperative outcome does not depend on how far ahead—2 rounds, 20 rounds, or more—the 
players project the truel will end.  Whatever this point is—even if it is determined probabilistically (as in 
the infinite-horizon game)—the players’ rational choices at the start, applying backward induction, will be 
to shoot immediately. 11 
survive if pi is sufficiently high).  
A Tale of Two Futures
11 
Our analysis of the infinite-horizon truel shows that there may be a conflict 
between two possible futures: 
1.  Every process must end by some definite point (e.g., each person’s lifespan 
     has an upper bound of, say, 125 years);          
2.  The precise end is unpredictable (it may be highly unlikely that a 125-year-old  
     person will live to be 126, but it is not impossible). 
Future 1, in which play is bounded, always leads to shooting in a simultaneous truel, 
whereas future 2, in which play is unbounded, may induce restraint.  
In fact, something akin to future 2 has been argued to be essential in sustaining 
cooperation in games like repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).  If the number of rounds n 
is known, then play in a repeated PD will, in theory, be non-cooperative, just as it is in 
the one-round and n-round (n known) simultaneous truels.   
But both experimental results and real-life examples of repeated PDs demonstrate 
that cooperation frequently occurs, which in theory can occur if the “shadow of the 
future” is sufficiently long.
12  Cooperation may also be rational—even in a one-shot PD 
and other games, such as Chicken—if the rules of play allow for farsighted thinking 
                                                 
11 The remainder of the paper is adapted from Brams and Kilgour (1998), though the truels analyzed therein 
are different from those discussed here; see also Bossert, Brams, and Kilgour (2001). 
12 Axelrod (1984) shows that when players follow a strategy of tit-for-tat in repeated PD, the shadow of the 
future induces cooperation if players do not discount future payoffs too much or, equivalently, the game 
continues to a new round with a sufficiently high probability.  But the accumulation of payoffs, round by 
round, in a repeated PD is very different from the round-by-round play of a simultaneous truel, wherein 
there are no payoffs until the game ends.  An infinite-horizon truel, we believe, best models the eschatology 
of lives (and worlds) that will definitely end—and some reckoning, in terms of rewards and punishments, 
will occur at the end—even though precisely when this end will occur is unknown.      12 
according to the “theory of moves” (Brams, 1994) and some other variants of standard 
game theory. 
More generally, cooperation can be sustained only if there is a sufficient level of 
hope—some reasonable expectation that cooperation will occur in the future.  If this hope 
vanishes, or there is a good prospect of its doing so, then non-cooperative play can be 
expected of rational players.  In games like PD and Chicken, such play will generally end 
in conflict, although this need not be the case in other games.  
As a case in point, outcome 3 in an infinite-horizon truel, in which nobody fires, is 
consistent with future 2, whereas outcomes 4 and 5 for a player are consistent with either 
future 1 or future 2.  It seems that some real-world players have adhered more to the 
thinking of future 2, including the United States, Russia, and China:  although each has 
possessed nuclear weapons for more than a generation, all have refrained from using 
them against each other in anything resembling a truel.   
The same self-restraint manifested itself with the non-use of poison gas in World 
War II, partly in response to revulsion against its use in World War I and partly in fear of 
reprisal.  By contrast, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats engaged in a very 
destructive truel in the former Yugoslavia in the early and mid-1990s, mirroring the 
boundedness of future 1.   
Effectively, the Serbs fired the first shot, apparently thinking that quickly 
conquering territory would give them a big edge.  After their early victories, however, 
they did not fare well because of the reactions of other players, including not only the 
original parties to the conflict but also new players, like NATO—especially after the 
conflict expanded to Kosovo in 1998. 13 
Everybody would be better off, we believe, if players did not think they were so 
clever as to be able to reason backward, from some endpoint, in plotting each other’s 
destruction.  Indeed, our results suggest that players would be less aggressive if the future 
were seen as somewhat murky—as in the infinite-horizon truel—which would render 
predictions about how many rounds a game will go, or even an upper bound on this 
number, hazardous.  This murkiness, oddly enough, is consistent with hope for the future.   
Alternatively, a sequential truel in which the order of choice is endogenous will 
induce cooperative behavior.  As we showed earlier, if any of A, B, or C contemplates 
shooting first, it ensures its own death when the remaining survivor takes aim.  In this 
case, it is clarity—because there will be retribution—rather than murkiness that induces 
cooperation.  
Conclusions 
Two possible eschatological views underlie bounded and unbounded play.  To the 
degree that the future seems to stretch out indefinitely, people probably act more 
responsibly toward each other, knowing that tomorrow they may pay the price for their 
untoward behavior today.  To sustain themselves, these people may try to develop 
reputations, often by adhering to certain moral strictures.  On the other hand, those who 
take a more short-term or bounded view may act less responsibly, even immorally. 
An important intellectual task is to devise institutions that render destructive 
behavior unprofitable.  But how one makes the future seem to run on smoothly, and 
instill confidence that the social fabric will not suddenly unravel, is not so clear. 
We think the best institutions for this purpose are those that strongly suggest, if not 
promise, a day of reckoning for those who depart egregiously from norms of fair play.  14 
To return to the Yugoslav example, it is unlikely that the parties who committed the most 
heinous crimes anticipated the involvement of the International Court of Justice and 
possible criminal trials.   
Likewise, many terrorists seem to look for safe havens from which they will not be 
extradited.  To the extent that international norms of justice not only sanction but also 
ensure, albeit in the indefinite future, punishment for serious crimes everywhere—
including those across national borders—then parties that fire the first shot will be less 
confident that that shot will be decisive.  
Short of ensuring future punishment, institutions that becloud the future, making 
predictions difficult, may also help to deter reprehensible actions.  These institutions 
range from democracy, with its uncertain electoral futures and other vicissitudes, to 
extended nuclear deterrence, which offers a good if not certain prospect of protection to 
allies that might be attacked by an aggressor.   
The possibility that these institutions or norms will set in motion forces to reward 
nonviolent behavior may be analogous to the preventive role of a third player in a truel.  
Although highly simplified as a social model, the truel does capture an essential feature 
of social behavior—third parties may play an important role in attenuating conflict.   
Their presence, it seems, eases the desperation one often finds in two-player 
conflicts, which can end up as wars of attrition.  The third player, in essence, provides a 
balancing mechanism that helps to sustain hope, whether the future is murky or clear.    15 
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